MSRI-UP MSRI-UP 2015: Geometric Combinatorics Motivated by the Social Sciences

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Jul 24, 2015
Friday

01:15 PM - 02:00 PM		Committee Selection with Approval Voting and Hypercubes Caleb Bugg (Morehouse College), Gabriel Elvin (University of California, Los Angeles)
Location MSRI: Baker Board Room Video Abstract In this paper we will examine elections of the following form: a committee of size k is to be electedwith two candidates running for each position. Each voter submits a ballot with his or her ideal committee, which generates their approval set. The approval sets of voters consist of committees that are “close” to their ideal preference. We define this notion of closeness with Hamming distance in a hypercube: the number of candidates by which a particular committee di Supplements -- Show Detail